Abstract. Membership encryption is a newly developed cryptographic primitive that combines membership proof and encryption into an unified setting. This paper presents a new flexible membership encryption scheme which is provably secure and significantly more efficient than the previous scheme. Further we apply our proposed membership encryption to construct a round optimal 1-outof-n priced oblivious transfer (POT) protocol which, unlike the existing 1-out-of-n POT schemes, is proven secure under the universally composable (UC) security model and thus preserves security when it is executed with multiple protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarily controlled way. Moreover, using our membership encryption, the POT protocol exhibits constant communication complexity on the buyer's side and O(n) communication cost on the vendor's side, which is so far the best known in the literature.
Introduction
Membership proof and membership encryption are two important cryptographic primitives of which membership encryption has been developed very recently. Membership proof [9] , [13] , [2] , [11] is useful and nontrivial particularly when protecting the privacy is at prime concern. Membership encryption combines encryption and membership proof into a unified setting, thereby improving the communication efficiency. Further, while a membership proof cannot be converted to a membership encryption, a successful decryption of the ciphertext in membership encryption naturally serves as a proof of membership. The idea of membership encryption is that, if a message is encrypted using an attribute and a privacy preserving token for a group attribute, decryption of the ciphertext is possible if and only if the used attribute is a member of the used group attribute. The concept of membership encryption has been introduced by Guo et al. [18] and, to the best of our knowledge, is so far the only membership encryption available in the literature. Membership encryption is applicable in advanced cryptographic protocols where privacy protection is important, e.g., priced oblivious transfer.
Priced oblivious transfer (POT) protocol aims at protecting the privacy of customers purchasing digital goods. More specifically, POT allows a buyer to purchase digital goods from a vendor without letting the vendor learn what it is buying. Usually after making a pre-payment to the vendor, the buyer engages in an unlimited number of transactions such that, as long as the buyer's balance contains sufficient funds it will successfully retrieve the selected item and its balance will be debited by the item's price. However, the buyer should be unable to retrieve an item whose cost exceeds its remaining balance.
The first priced oblivious transfer scheme [1] , as well as subsequent works [21] analyse security in the half-simulation model, where simulation security is required against the buyer only and stand-alone privacy is needed against the vendor. As explained in [14] , these protocols fail even under sequential composition and are shown to be vulnerable to practical attacks. Afterwards, a number of universally composable (UC)-secure priced oblivious transfer protocols have been proposed [19] , [10] , [20] . The UCsecurity paradigm [12] provides a framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analysing their security. Protocols that are proven UC-secure maintain their security even when they are run concurrently with an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances controlled by an adversary.
Our contributions: Our contribution in this paper is two fold:
-Firstly, we introduce a cost-effective flexible membership encryption scheme secure in the standard model that outperforms the existing one [18] . -Secondly, we use our membership encryption scheme to construct a UC-secure 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer protocol having the best computational and communication efficiency over the previous similar schemes.
To be precise, our membership encryption scheme is built on a prime order bilinear group setup. Our scheme is proven to be secure in the selective security model of [18] without using random oracles under the Square Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and Simultaneous Square Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Unlike [18] , our scheme is flexible in the sense that the universe of attributes A can be changed at any time keeping the setup unaltered. This property is crucial for an application such as priced oblivious transfer where item prices may change with time. Further in our membership encryption, the group token and ciphertext respectively have one and two group elements, whereas, those for [18] consists of three group elements each. Also, our scheme requires (n 2 +n)/2+2k+3 exponentiations and 2 pairings compared to n 2 + 3n + 4k + 12 exponentiations and 3 pairings for [18] , where k is the size of the group attribute. On a more positive note, our scheme, when applied with a fixed universe of attributes, results in constant computational cost.
Next, we apply our proposed membership encryption scheme to construct an 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer protocol that is UC-secure under the assumption that there is an honestly generated common reference string, employing Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof techniques [17] , P-Signatures [3] and noninteractive range proof [19] . Security is proven in a static corruption model without relying on random oracles under the Hidden Strong Diffie-Hellman, Triple Diffie-Hellman, Decisional linear and Square Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Our protocol allows more than one item to have the same price. After an initialization of complexity O(n), each transfer phase is optimal in terms of rounds of communication. Moreover, the complexities of computation and communication are constant on the buyer's side whereas O(n) on the vendor's side. When compared with [1] , [21] , which are the only two existing 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer schemes, our construction is concrete, provides significantly strong security guarantees and achieves the best known computational and communication efficiency.
Outline of the paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the definitions and security notions of membership encryption and priced oblivious transfer together with the security assumptions we use in Section 2. Next, in Section 3 we present our membership encryption scheme along with the security proof and efficiency comparison with existing scheme. After that, we demonstrate our priced oblivious transfer protocol constructed using our proposed membership encryption providing the complete security argument of the protocol in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
MD[C, G, S].
The membership encryption is said to be correct if
MD[ME[A, P(G), M ], G, S] =
M, when A ∈ G ⊥, when A / ∈ G
• Security Model: We adopt the security model of [18] to analyse the security of our membership encryption scheme.
Definition 1 (Message Security).
A membership encryption captures the message security if given a ciphertext generated with attribute A and group token P(G) for a group attribute G, it is computationally hard to decrypt the ciphertext when either the decryptor does not have the secret key S of P(G) or the attribute A does not satisfy the membership, i.e., A / ∈ G.
More formally, message security is captured by the following two games.
Game 1: Indistinguishability against Secret Key Setup: The challenger runs the MSetup algorithm to generate the system parameter SP and sends it to the adversary. Phase 1: The adversary queries for group tokens and decryption which are answered by the challenger as follows: -For a token query on group attribute G i that is adaptively chosen by the adversary, the challenger responds by generating (P(G i ), S i ) and sending P(G i ) to the adversary. -For a decryption query on a ciphertext C i for (A, P(G i )) where P(G i ) is generated by the challenger, the challenger returns ⊥ to the adversary if A / ∈ G i ; otherwise, the challenger responds by decrypting the ciphertext with S i , and sending the decryption result to the adversary. Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger an attribute A * , a group token P(G * ) and two messages M 0 , M 1 , where P(G * ) was generated in the query phase. The challenger responds by randomly choosing a coin c ∈ {0, 1}, generating a ciphertext C * ← ME[A * , P(G * ), M c ], and sending the challenge ciphertext to the adversary. Phase 2: The adversary can continue the query as in Phase 1 except no decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C * for (A * , P(G * )). Win: The adversary outputs a guess c of c and wins the game if c = c.
We define the advantage of the adversary as
Definition 2 (Security against Secret Key). A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1 λ is (t, q k , q d , )-secure against secret key if = Adv I1 is a negligible function of λ for all adversaries who make at most q k token queries, q d decryption queries and whose running time is at most t where t is polynomial in the security parameter. We call the membership encryption selectively secure [5] against secret key if the adversary outputs A * before the setup of system parameters. Note 1. The security model presented above captures security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) which is the strongest security notion. If we do not allow any decryption query in Phase 1 or Phase 2, the resulting model is relatively weaker and is known as chosen plaintext attack (CPA) security model.
Game 2: Indistinguishability against Membership
Setup: The challenger runs the MSetup algorithm to generate the system parameter SP and sends it to the adversary. Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger an attribute A * , a group token P(G * ), group attribute G * , secret key S and two messages M 0 , M 1 .The challenger first verifies that A * / ∈ P(G * ) with G * and S. Then, the challenger responds by randomly choosing a coin c ∈ {0, 1}, generating a ciphertext C * ← ME[A * , P(G * ), M c ], and sending the challenge ciphertext to the adversary. Win: The adversary outputs a guess c of c and wins the game if c = c.
The advantage of the adversary is defined as Adv I2 = |Pr[c = c] − 1/2|.
Definition 3 (Security against Membership).
A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1 λ is (t, )-secure against membership if = Adv I2 is a negligible function of λ for all adversaries whose running time is at most t which is a polynomial in the security parameter. We call the membership encryption selectively secure [5] against membership if the adversary outputs A * and G * before the setup of system parameters.
Definition 4 (Privacy).
A membership encryption preserves the privacy of group attributes if given a group token P(G) and two group attributes G 0 = {A i1 , A i2 , . . . , A i k 1 } and G 1 = {A j1 , A j2 , . . . , A j k 2 }, it is computationally hard to decide whether G = G 0 or G = G 1 .
The notion of privacy is formally defined by the following game.
Game 3: Privacy Setup: The challenger runs the MSetup algorithm to generate the system parameter SP and sends it to the adversary. Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger two group attributes G 0 = {A i1 , A i2 , . . . , A i k 1 } and
The challenger responds by randomly choosing a coin c ∈ {0, 1}, generating P(G c ) for G c and sending P(G c ) to the adversary. Win: The adversary outputs a guess c of c and wins the game if c = c.
We define the advantage of adversary as Adv P = |Pr[c = c] − 1/2|.
Definition 5 (Privacy of Group Tokens).
A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1 λ is said to (t, ) preserves the privacy of group tokens if = Adv P is a negligible function of λ for all adversaries whose running time is at most t, where t is a polynomial in the security parameter. We say it unconditionally preserves the privacy of group tokens if = 0 for any time t and SP is generated by the adversary.
Priced Oblivious Transfer and Security Notion
A 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer (POT) is an "on-line" protocol between a buyer B and a vendor V. This enables the buyer and vendor to engage in multiple transactions. Both the buyer and the vendor are allowed to store (short) state information between transactions. Below we describe the desired functionality of a 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer protocol following [1] . Main Protocol: Initialization phase: At time t = 0, the buyer initializes its balance with a pre-payment to the vendor. Transfer phase: At time t > 0, (t = 1, 2, . . .) -The vendor may choose a database M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) of n items for sale and some public information Pub concerning the identity of these items. Pub contains a price list p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ). -The buyer then may decide to buy the i-th item, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If the buyer's remaining balance is sufficiently large, i.e., the combined price of all items previously received plus the current price p i does not exceed the initial deposit, the buyer receives M i and obtains no information about the other items. Besides, the vendor will not be able to know which item is bought.
Subscription:
The main motivation of a subscription is to allow efficient one-way communication from the vendor to the buyer. In the subscription setting we have the following operations:
-Subscribe to the i-th channel; by subscribing, the buyer indicates that it wishes to continue buying the i-th item until overriding the subscription with a new request. We assume that throughout the subscription, the buyer is charged the price p i effective when initiating the subscription (even though p may change). -Unsubscribe, i.e., terminate a previous "subscribe" request.
-Do nothing, i.e., maintain its default subscription (if any) or keep idle (otherwise).
• Universally Composable Security Model: We use the universally composable (UC) security framework [12] with static corruptions to prove security of our POT construction. In this framework, parties are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines (ITM). A protocol ψ is UC-secure if there exists no environment Z that can distinguish whether it is interacting with the adversary A and parties running the protocol ψ or with the ideal process for carrying out the desired task. In the ideal process, the ideal adversary E and dummy parties interact with an ideal functionality F ψ which acts as a trusted ITM that carries out the desired task. More formally, we say that the protocol ψ emulates the ideal process when, for all environments Z, the ensembles IDEAL F ψ ,E,Z and REAL ψ,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable, where IDEAL F ψ ,E,Z denotes the ensemble of random variables {OUT Z,C(F ψ ,E) (λ, x)} λ∈N,x∈{0,1} * and REAL ψ,A,Z denotes {OUT Z,C(ψ,A) (λ, x)} λ∈N,x∈{0,1} * , C being the control function that determines which ITM can write to which tapes of which ITMs in the course of the execution and OUT Z,C(·, ·) (λ, x) being the random variable that describes the output of the execution with 1 λ as Z's security parameter together with x as Z's input. The identity of an ITM is determined at invocation time by the invoking instance and it is unchangeable. Each identity consists of two different fields: a session id (sid) and a party id (pid). For a particular instance of the protocol, sid is fixed for all the parties. This sid is determined by Z.
As in [19] , our construction operates in the F CRS -hybrid plain model, where parties have access to an honestly-generated common reference string crs and authenticated channels. Further, following [16] , [19] , we assume the environment learns about the common reference string from the adversary, and thus the ideal world adversary can setup a string with "trapdoor information". This is at odds with the notion that the crs is a "global" entity. However, as mentioned in [16] , there are strong impossibility results for UCrealising oblivious transfer in a setting where the crs is available to everyone (including the environment) and can no longer be crafted by the ideal world adversary.
Below we present the description of the ideal functionality F CRS for generating common reference string. F CRS is parameterized with a distribution D and a set of participants P. For the POT scheme, P is restricted to contain only the buyer B and the vendor V. We also describe an ideal functionality F POT for 1-out-of-n POT. F CRS : On input (sid, crs) from party P , it checks if P ∈ P. If not, it aborts. Otherwise, if there is no value r recorded, it picks r ← D and records r. It sends (sid, crs, r) to P . (sid, V, Pub) were not received earlier or deposit − p σt < 0. Otherwise, it sends (sid, request) to V and receives (sid, {M 1 , . . . , M n }) in response where M i 's are the messages whose identities were contained in Pub such that each M i ∈ {0, 1} l . It updates deposit = deposit−p σt and hands (sid, M σt ) to B as well as (sid, 1) to the adversary.
Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
Let G and G T be multiplicative groups of prime order p. A bilinear map e : G × G → G T must satisfy the following properties: (a) Bilinearity : A map e : G × G → G T is bilinear if e(a x , b y ) = e(a, b) xy for all a, b ∈ G and x, y ∈ Z p ; (b) Non-degeneracy: For all generators g ∈ G, e(g, g) generates G T ; (c) Efficiency: There exists an efficient algorithm that outputs the pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) and an efficient algorithm to compute e(a, b) for any a, b ∈ G.
for random exponents x, y ∈ Z * p , c 1 , . . . , c l ∈ Z p , the l-TDH assumption holds if it is computationally hard to output a tuple (g µx , g µy , g
for random exponents a, b ∈ Z * p , c, d ∈ Z p , the DLIN assumption holds if it computationally hard to decide whether z = g c+d .
The validity of the HSDH assumption in the generic group model is proven by Boyen and Waters [8] and that of the DLIN assumption by Boneh et al. [6] . The TDH assumption has been introduced by Belenkiy et al. [3] . We introduce two new assumptions, viz., the Square Decisional Bilinear DH assumption, which is a derived version of the well-known Decisional Bilinear DH (DBDH) assumption introduced by Boneh and Francklin [7] , and an extended version of that, namely, the Simultaneous Square Decisional Bilinear DH assumption.
p , the SqDBDH assumption holds if it computationally hard to decide whether z = e(g, g)
T for random exponents a, b ∈ Z * p , the SimSqDBDH assumption holds if it is computationally hard to decide whether z 1 = e(g, g) a 2 b and z 2 = e(g, g)
The SqDBDH problem and the SimSqDBDH problem in (G, G T , e) are no harder than the DBDH problem in (G, G T , e). However, in both cases, the converse is currently an open problem. Nonetheless, one can easily establish that the computational version of both of our new problems are exactly equivalent to the Bilinear DH (BDH) problem. We believe the SqDBDH and the SimSqDBDH assumptions hold in certain bilinear groups of prime order.
Our Membership Encryption
MSetup: On input a security parameter 1 λ and universe of attributes A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊆ Z p , a trusted authority runs the MSetup algorithm that works as follows:
-Choose a pairing group PG = (p, G, G T , e, g).
zj Aj , and compute
MGroupGen: The decryptor takes as input a group attribute
any k ≤ n, the system parameter SP, and computes the group token P(G) = (
where r $ ← − Z p is the secret key of the group token. The decryptor sends P(G) to the encryptor and keeps r secret to itself. MEncrypt: Taking as input an attribute A i * ∈ A, a group token P(G) = w, a message M ∈ G T and the system parameter SP, the encryptor prepares the ciphertext as follows:
S ) and send C to the decryptor.
MDecrypt: On input the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 ), the secret key r, the attribute A i * , the group attribute G = {A i1 , . . . , A i k } and the system parameter SP, the decryptor proceeds as follows:
-Retrieve the message as M = C 1 /e(Λ, C 2 ).
• Correctness and Security Proof:
Theorem 1 (Indistinguishability against Secret Key). The above membership encryption scheme is (t , q k , )-selectively secure against secret key under the assumption that the SimSqDBDH problem is (t, )-hard. Here, t = t − O(q k nt e ), q k is number of group token query made by the adversary and = q k , where t e denotes the average time of an exponentiation in G.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary who can (t , ) break the membership encryption against secret key under the selective security model by a chosen-plaintext attack. We construct an algorithm B that solves the SimSqDBDH problem in time t with advantage . B interacts with the adversary as follows:
) be the pairing group and A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } be the attribute universe. The adversary outputs the attribute A i * for challenge. Setup: The algorithm B works as follows to simulate the system parameter.
c1 , e(g, g) c2 ) be the given instance of the SimSqDBDH problem.
B sends the system parameter SP = (PG,
) to the adversary.
Phase 1: The algorithm B randomly chooses k * from [1, q k ] and simulates the group tokens as follows:
The algorithm B randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and simulates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
If
(a−bA i * )ba and hence C * is a valid ciphertext. B sends the ciphertext C * to the adversary. Win: The adversary outputs c ∈ {0, 1}. Then B outputs 1 if the adversary outputs c = c, i.e., the adversary wins, and outputs 0 otherwise.
This completes the description of the simulation. If c 1 = a 2 b and c 2 = ab 2 , the challenge ciphertext is valid and the adversary will output c = c with probability ( 1 2 + ); otherwise, if c 1 and c 2 are random then the challenge ciphertext is also random and hence the adversary outputs c = c with probability
The simulation is successful when G * = G k * which holds with probability
In order to see the relationship between t and t , note that the simulation time is mainly dominated by the group token simulation and each group token requires O(n) exponentiations in G.
Theorem 2 (Indistinguishability against Membership). The membership encryption scheme introduced above is (t , )-selectively secure against membership under the assumption that the SqDBDH problem is (t, )-hard. Here, t = t − O(n 2 t e ) and = , where t e denotes the average time of an exponentiation in G.
Proof. Suppose there exist an adversary who can (t , ) break the membership encryption against membership under selective security model. We construct an algorithm B that solves the SqDBDH problem in time t with advantage . B interacts with the adversary as follows: Initialization: Let PG = (p, G, G T , e, g) be the pairing group and A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } be the attribute universe. The adversary outputs (A i * , G * ) for challenge where
be the given instance of the SqDBDH problem. B generates the system parameter as follows:
Challenge: The adversary returns (P(G * ), S * , M 0 , M 1 ) for challenge. Let the secret randomness or the secret key in computation of P(G * ) as sent by the adversary be S * = r and G * = {A i1 , . . . , A i k }. B randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and simulates the challenge ciphertext as follows:
. B sends the ciphertxet C * to the adversary. Win: The adversary outputs c ∈ {0, 1}, and the algorithm B outputs 1 if c = c, i.e., the adversary wins, and outputs 0 otherwise.
This completes the description of our simulation. If c 1 = a 2 b, the challenge ciphertext is valid and the adversary will output c = c with probability ( 1 2 + ); otherwise, the challenge ciphertext is universally random and the adversary outputs c = c with probability 
In order to see the relationship between t and t , note that the simulation time is mainly dominated by the u i,j simulation each of which takes 1 exponentiation and there are O(n 2 ) such u i,j 's.
Theorem 3 (Privacy). P(G) unconditionally preserves the privacy of all attributes in G.
Proof. Let P(G 0 ) be the group token generated from G 0 = {A i1 , . . . , A i k 1 } and with secret randomness (or the secret key) r.
can also be seen as a group token generated from G 1 with secret randomness r . Thus, given P(G c ), c ∈ {0, 1} no adversary can distinguish whether c = 0 or c = 1 with positive advantage for any G 0 and G 1 .
Remark 1. As in [18] , the membership encryption described above is secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). Let ME[σ, r] be the ciphertext on σ ∈ G T encrypted with the randomness r ∈ Z p . Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto approach [15] in the random oracle model, our scheme can also be extended to the security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Let I : G T → {0, 1} * be an efficiently computable injective map and
lm be cryptographic hash functions, where {0, 1} lm denotes the new message space. If ME[σ, r] is secure against CPA then the membership encryption construction ME[σ, H 1 (A, P(G), I(σ), M )], H 2 (I(σ)) ⊕ M , for (A, P(G)), is secure against CCA.
• Efficiency: Table 1 presents the computation and communication complexities of our membership encryption in comparison with that of [18] . Our construction has significantly less cost than [18] both in terms of computation and communication. In Particular, the number of exponentiations is much smaller in our scheme.
Note 2. Our membership encryption scheme has the advantage that, unlike [18] our scheme does not involve the attributes explicitly in the setup parameter. As a result, the same setup can be used for performing the operation using different universe of attributes A with the only restriction that |A| = n and A i 's are such that for all i = j, g ziAi = g zj Aj holds. Precisely, assume that initially the setup parameter is constructed for some attribute universe A = {A 1 , . . . , A n } and later we want to use the [18] (
Here, k denotes the size of the group attribute.
same setup for a different attribute universe A = {A 1 , . . . , A n }. Thus initially g ziAi = g zj Aj for all i = j and now we require g ziA i = g zj A j for all i = j. Note that if the condition is violated for some i = j, we can slightly modify A i or A j , e.g., set A i = A i + 1 etc., to overcome such violation. In this sense our scheme is more flexible than that of [18] which can be applied only with an universe of attributes fixed before generation of the system parameters. This property makes our scheme particularly suitable for application in POT where item prices may change with time.
Note 3. Our scheme, if applied with a constant universe of attributes, can be made much more simple and efficient. Note that, if A is fixed then we can set u i = g ziAi and u i,j = g ziAizj Aj , i = j. In that case the group token P(G) will be (
and to decrypt C we need to compute M = C 1 /e((
Thus if A is fixed for the entire operation, then the MGroupGen, MEncrypt and MDecrypt algorithms will each require only a single exponentiation resulting in a scheme with constant computation complexity. The security argument will be similar for the modified scheme. On the contrary, the scheme of [18] is applicable only with a fixed universe of attributes and has quite large computation complexity.
Our Priced Oblivious Transfer
In this section, we show how to construct an efficient 1-out-of-n priced oblivious transfer protocol (POT) from our membership encryption. Our 1-out-of-n POT scheme is inspired from the k-out-of-n POT scheme of [19] . To construct the POT we employ the Groth-Sahai proof system [17] for the DLIN instance (Appendix A.1), the P-Signature scheme [3] (Appendix A.2) and the range prove [19] (Appendix A.3) with our membership encryption. In our scheme, each transaction (a single 'buy' operation) requires two passes of communication: (1) a message from the buyer; (2) the vendor's reply. This is optimal since even without privacy the buyer still needs to specify the item he wants to retrieve and the vendor needs to send this item. Also our scheme allows more than one items to have the same price. Protocol requirements: Our scheme is parameterized with integers (n, l) (for the number of messages and their length), p max (the upper bound for the prices) and A = d a (the upper bound for the deposit). This scheme is built on a pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) such that p max < A (mod p) holds. As in [1] , [19] , we develop a prepaid scheme, where in the initialization phase the buyer B pays an initial deposit ac 0 to the vendor V and in subsequent transfer phases this deposit is subtracted by the price p σt of the message M σt that is being bought. The message space is {0, 1}
l , but we abuse notation and write M i to denote the corresponding group element in G T assuming the existance of some efficient and invertible mapping. Also the prices p i and the deposit ac 0 are considered as elements of Z p .
Informally speaking, in our POT scheme, the buyer B communicates with the vendor V in an initialization phase to make a prepayment, followed by several transfer phases. In each transfer the vendor chooses a set of messages {M 1 , . . . , M n } with prices {p 1 , . . . , p n } for sale and publishes an information Pub regarding those messages. Pub contains specification of {p 1 , . . . , p n }. Then the buyer chooses to buy a particular message M σt and sends a request Q to V. The vendor V then returns a response R to B from which B retrieves M σt .
The POT scheme must ensure that V learns neither the price of the message being queried nor the new value of the account, while B pays the correct price for the message updating the balance honestly and that he has enough funds to buy it. To achieve this, in the initialization phase B sends the deposit ac 0 from which V prepares a commitment on it. In the t-th transfer, B sends a commitment to the new value of the account ac t and proves that (1) this value is correct, i.e., that ac t = ac t−1 − p σt and that (2) it is nonnegative. In order to allow for (1), we need to ensure that B uses the correct price. To accomplish this, V uses membership encryption to encrypt each message M i with its proper price p i and the group token sent by B. To ensure that this group token is honestly computed, B proves non-interactively the possession of a P-Signature [3] provided by the trusted authority as part of the common reference string on the component of the common reference string that has been used in forming the group token. Then V sends all these computed ciphertext to B. Now the property called 'indistinguishability against membership' of the membership encryption scheme ensures that B can decrypt the ciphertext C σt to obtain M σt if B has paid the correct price p σt . To achieve (2), V computes in the initialization phase parameters of the range proof [19] namely params Range and hands them to B. In each transfer phase, B proves that the new value of the account ac t ∈ [0, . . . , A). We formally describe our POT scheme below. Initialization phase: At time t = 0, on input (sid, V, n) for the vendor V and (sid, B, n, ac 0 ) for the buyer B, 1. V queries F CRS with (sid,V, B, n). F CRS generates crs by running POTGenCRS(1 λ , p max , A, n), as discussed below, and sends (sid, crs) to V. POTGenCRS(1 λ , p max , A, n): Given security parameter 1 λ and the total number of messages n, -F CRS generates a Groth-Sahai reference string crs P oK under DLIN instance for the pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) such that p max < A (mod p) holds, i.e., crs P oK = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ), where
-F CRS chooses random u ← G and computes q i = u zi , i = 1, . . . , n. -F CRS runs PKeyGen(crs Sig ) of the P-Signature scheme, discussed in Appendix A.2, where crs Sig = (crs P oK , u) to get a signing-verification key pair (sk = (γ, δ), pk = (g γ , g δ )), γ, δ $ ← − Z p , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it computes s i = PSign(crs Sig , sk, z i ).
). We mention that v i 's help B to decrypt the ciphertext sent by V and (u i , q i , s i ) is used to construct a non-interactive proof of possession of the P-Signature s i on z i by B without knowing z i , as explained in Appendix A.2, in the transfer phase. 2. B queries F CRS with (sid,V, B, n). F CRS sends (sid, crs) to B. This crs is the same as that generated by F CRS following the procedure POTGenCRS. 3. V executes the following procedure POTInitVendor(crs, A) to obtain params Range and sends (sid, params Range ) to B. POTInitVendor(crs, A): Taking input crs and A, V works as follows: -V parses the crs to obtain crs Sig = (crs P oK , u).
-V runs RPInitVerifier(crs Sig , A), discussed in Appendix A.3, to obtain params Range . 4. Upon receiving (sid, params Range ) from V, the buyer B computes (P, D (P riv) 0 ) by invoking POTInitBuyer on input (crs, params Range , ac 0 ) as follows. POTInitBuyer(crs, params Range , ac 0 ): On input params Range and a deposit ac 0 ∈ [0, . . . , A); -B parses crs to obtain crs Sig = (crs P oK , u).
-B runs RPInitProver(crs Sig , params Range ), discussed in Appendix A.3 , to verify params Range .
-If the above check fails, B outputs reject. Otherwise, B sets P = ac 0 and D
B aborts if the output is reject. Otherwise, B sends (sid, P ) to V and keeps D (P riv) 0 secret to itself. Note that, B also needs to pay an amount of ac 0 to V through an arbitrary payment channel. 5. After getting the initial deposit money, V runs the procedure POTGetDeposit(crs, P, A) described below to check that ac 0 corresponds to amount of money received. POTGetDeposit(crs, P, A): Receiving P from B, V works as follows: , σ t ): Taking input set of prices {p 1 , . . . , p n } and a selection value σ t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B proceeds as follows:
-B parses crs to obtain crs P oK , u, 1,1 , l t−1,2 , l t−1,3 ) ), where (l t−1,1 , l t−1,2 , l t−1,3 ) ∈ Z (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ), open zσ t = (b 1 , b 2 , b 3 
Note that pok t includes range proof NIPK{(g
{PVerifySig(pk , s αj , α j ) = accept} 
, pk), Q to obtain (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , pok t , D t ). -V verifies pok t by running PoKVarify on input crs P oK and it aborts if the output is reject. For this verification, V uses the commitments (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , D t−1 , D t ). For a clear insight regarding such verifications the reader is refer to Appendix A.1.
) where open zσ t pσ t = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) ∈ Z 3 p is not known to V. Note that w 3 can be written as w 3 = g zσ t pσ t g b , where b = r 1 + r 2 +(r+s)r 3 ∈ Z p is random since open zσ t pσ t = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) ∈ Z 3 p is random. Thus w 3 can be viewed as a group token P(G) for group attribute G = {p σt } according to our membership encryption introduced in Section 3. However, in this case we are only able to guarantee computational privacy of the group token since the group token in this case is part of a commitment of the Groth-Sahai proof system which has computational witness indistinguishability, whereas, in the original membership encryption scheme, the privacy of group tokens is unconditional.
Note that, C i is essentially the membership encryption of M i using p i and the group token w 3 for {p σt }. -V sets R = (C 1 , . . . , C n ). 3. B, on receiving (sid, R) from V, runs the following procedure POTComplete(crs, R, Q (P riv) ) to obtain M σt . POTComplete(crs, R, Q (P riv) ): Taking input R and private state
where open zσ t pσ t = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) is known to B.
-B parses C σt as (C will be needed when we will fit our scheme in a subscription setting (Appendix C). In a subscription setting B needs to store his remaining balance after each transaction. In case B wishes to terminate his subscription before his legitimate period expires, he will have to use D (P rive) t corresponding to the last transaction to open the respective D t to a trusted third party or the court of law in the process of claiming his remaining balance from V.
• A note on efficiency: The common reference string of our POT protocol consists of n 2 +6n+12 group elements. Regarding the communication complexity of this scheme, we note that, in the initialization phase V's message contains 3d + 2 group elements, which is the size of params Range , and that of B involves a single element of Z p . In each transfer phase B's request Q is composed of 30a + 57 group elements and V's response R has 2n group elements. For the computational complexity of our POT scheme, observe that the initialization phase requires n 2 + 6n + 7 exponentiations for F CRS , 3d + 3 exponentiations for V and d exponentiations along with 3d pairings for B. Further, each transfer phase involves 2 exponentiations, 1 pairings plus the complexity of constructing the NIPK (1), which involves the cost of generating a range proof, a non-interactive proof of a P-Signature possession and Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof of knowledge for two additional pairing product equations, for B and 3n exponentiations, n + 87a + 174 pairings for V. We note that A = d a is the upper bound of buyer's account.
Remark 3.
Observe that, since in our POT construction the membership encryption discussed in Section 3 is applied for singleton group attributes {p σt }, u i,j 's are not required for decrypting the ciphertext C σt . Thus we can omit {u i,j } i =j from the crs resulting in further reduction in crs size an well as the number of exponentiations computed by F CRS by n 2 . This modification will not affect the security argument.
Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a new efficient, provably secure membership encryption scheme and have applied it to develop an efficient 1-out-of-n POT protocol. Privacy preserving membership proof and encryption are both simultaneously used in many complex cryptographic protocols. Hence, it is really beneficial to have more efficient scheme that combines both of them in a single framework, i.e., to design efficient and practical membership encryption scheme. Our proposed membership encryption has constant length group token and constant ciphertext size both of which is shorter than that of [18] . Also unlike [18] , our scheme is flexible in the sense that the same setup can be used with different universe of attributes. This property is important for applications such as POT where item prices may change with time. Moreover, computational complexity is constant, when applied with a fixed universe of attributes, making our scheme significantly more efficient than that of [18] which has quite large complexity. Our developed POT protocol is secure under universally composable framework and thus, unlike the existing 1-out-of-n schemes [1] , [21] available in the literature, preserves security when it is executed with multiple protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarily controlled way.Further, the protocol is round optimal having constant computation and communication cost on the buyer's side and O(n) complexity on the vendor's side, which is so far the best known for 1-out-of-n POT.
A Some Necessary Cryptographic Tools
A.1 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge of [17] Let R be an efficiently computable relation and L = {y : R(y, w) = accept for some w} be an NPlanguage. For tuples (y, w) ∈ R, we call y the instance and w the witness. A non-interactive proof of knowledge system consists of algorithms PoKSetup, PoKProve and PoKVerify. PoKSetup(1 λ ) outputs a common reference string crs P oK , PoKProve(crs P oK , y, w) computes a proof of knowledge pok of instance y by using witness w and PoKVerify(crs P oK , y, pok) outputs accept if pok is correct.
Zero-knowledge captures the notion that a verifier learns nothing from the proof except the truth of the statement. Witness-indistinguishability is a weaker property that guarantees that the verifier learns nothing about the witness that was used in the proof. In either case, we will also require soundness, meaning that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier of a false statement, and completeness, meaning that all correctly computed proofs are accepted by the honest verification algorithm. See [4] for formal definitions.
In addition, a proof of knowledge needs to be extractable. Extractability means that there exists a polynomial time extractor (PoKExtractSetup,PoKExtract). Algorithm PoKExtractSetup(1 λ ) generates parameters crs P oK that are identically distributed to the ones generated by algorithm PoKSetup and an extraction trapdoor td ext . PoKExtract(crs P oK , td ext , y, pok) extracts the witness w with all but negligible probability when PoKVerify(crs P oK , y, pok) outputs accept.
We recall the notion of f -extractability defined by Belenkiy et al. [3] . In an f -extractable proof system the extractor PoKExtract extracts a value z such that z = f (w) ∧ (y, w) ∈ R for some w. If f (·) is the identity function, we get the usual notion of extractability.
Commitment schemes: A non-interactive commitment scheme consists of algorithms ComSetup and Commit. ComSetup(1 λ ) generates the parameters of the commitment scheme params Com . The algorithm Commit(params Com , x, open) outputs a commitment C to x using auxiliary information open. A commitment C is opened by revealing (x, open) and checking Commit(params Com , x, open) = C. A commitment scheme has a hiding property and a binding property. Informally speaking, the hiding property ensures that a commitment C to x does not reveal any information about x, whereas the binding property ensures that C cannot be opened to another value x . When it is clear from the context, we omit the commitment parameters params Com . A notation for f-extractable non-interactive proofs of knowledge (NIPK): We are interested in NIPK about (unconditionally binding) commitments. By 'x in C' we denote that there exists open such that C = Commit(params Com , x, open) . After Belenkiy et al. [3] , we use the following notation to express an fextractable NIPK pok, on the instance (C 1 , . . . , C m , Condition) with witness ( x 1 , open 1 , . . . , x m , open m , s) that allows to extract all the witnesses except the openings of the commitments. Here Condition stands for a constraint on crs, x 1 , . . . , x m , s.
The f -extractability of a NIPK ensures that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of crs, we can extract (x 1 , . . . , x m , s) from pok, when PoKVerify accepts, x i is contained in commitment C i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and Condition(crs, x 1 , . . . , x m , s) is satisfied. To further abbreviate this notation, we omit crs when it is understood from the context. Applying the notation to Groth-Sahai proofs: We now illustrate below equation (2) by applying the notation to Groth-Sahai proofs [17] which allow proving statements about pairing product equations. The pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g) is part of the common reference string crs P oK output by PoKSetup(1 λ ) and the instance consists of the constants
Internally, Groth-Sahai proofs prove relations between commitments. A homomorphism guarantees that the same relations also hold for the committed values. Normally, as the first step in creating the proof, the prover prepares commitments
for all values Y i in G. Then, the instance, known to the prover and the verifier, is the pairing product equation alone (i.e., its constants ).
In addition, it is possible to add pre-existing Groth-Sahai commitments
, n ≤ m, to the instance for some of the Y i values. The corresponding openings open Yi become part of the witness. The proof will be computed in the same way, except that for values with existing commitments no fresh commitments need to be computed. We will write C i = Commit(Y i , open Yi ) to create Groth-Sahai commitments. Note that here Commit uses parameters contained in the crs P oK of the Groth-Sahai proof systems. This proof system generates f -extractable witness indistinguishable 1 NIPK pok of the form
In order to construct NIPK for a system of pairing product equations, a separate proof is to be computed for each equation. In [17] , Groth and Sahai have given three different instantiations of their proof system. (In fact, their proposed proof system also works in asymmetric pairing groups.) Groth-Sahai proofs are extractable, composable witness-indistinguishable and composable zero-knowledge (given certain conditions). For definitions of these notions the reader is referred to [17] . Out of the three instantiations presented in [17] , we will consider the one based on the DLIN assumption. In this instantiation, the common reference string crs P oK is of the form crs P oK = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ), where
e(A i , Y i ) = t T , the proof pok has the form
and for a quadratic equation
pok consists of nine group elements in G of similar type.
The verification of the above proof is done by checking three and nine pairing product equalities in linear and quadratic case respectively. Below we present a small example which is used in our POT construction. w 2 , w 3 ) . Further suppose that the proof pok = (π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ). All of C i 's and pok are of the form as described above. The verification equalities for the above linear equation are e(g, u i )e(g −1 , v i )e(g −1 , w i ) = e(π 1 , x i )e(π 2 , y i )e(π 3 , z i ) for i = 1, 2, 3.
A.2 P-Signature Scheme of [3] P-Signatures introduced by Belenkiy et al. [3] are signatures equipped with a common reference string crs Sig and a NIPK that allows proving possession of a signature of a committed message. Belenkiy et al. show in [3] how to use the Groth-Sahai proof system to build this proof. Since in their construction M ∈ Z p and Groth-Sahai proofs prove knowledge of a witness in G, they need to compute a bijection F (M ) ∈ G and prove knowledge of F (M ). The P-Signature scheme is said to be F -unforgeable if no p.p.t. adversary can output (F (M ), s) without previously obtaining a signature on M .
Below we present the P-Signature scheme of [3] . This P-Signature scheme is employed in the range proof discussed in Appendix A.3 and in our POT scheme. PSetup: Taking as input a security parameter 1 λ , a trusted authority runs the Groth-Sahai PoKSetup with input 1 λ to obtain crs P oK for pairing groups (p, G, G T , e, g), picks random u ∈ G, and publishes crs Sig = (crs P oK , u).
PKeygen: On input crs Sig , the signer picks a secret key sk = (α, β) $ ← − Z p and computes a public key pk = (v, w) = (g α , g β ).
PSign: The signer takes as input (crs Sig , sk, M ∈ Z p ), picks random r
. PVerifySig: On input (crs Sig , pk, M, s), the verifier outputs accept when e(s 1 , vg M s 2 ) = e(g, g), e(u, s 2 ) = e(s 3 , w). Otherwise, it outputs reject.
Using Groth-Sahai proofs, a NIPK of such a signature is constructed as follows. This is a proof of a pairing product equation of the form
We abbreviate this expression as NIPK{(g M , u M , s) : PVerifySig(pk, s, M ) = accept}. We would like to highlight the fact that to construct this NIPK the knowledge of g M and u M is sufficient, no need to know M explicitly. This scheme is F -unforgeable (F (M ) = (g M , u M )) under the HSDH and the TDH assumption.
A.3 Non-Interactive Range Proof of [19] We use the efficient non-interactive range proof proposed by Rial et al. [19] to prove that a committed value σ ∈ Z p lies in an interval [0, d a ) by representing σ in base d and employing P-Signature of [3] discussed in Appendix A.2. RPSetup(1 λ ): Given a security parameter 1 λ , a trusted third party executes PSetup(1 λ ) to generate crs Sig = (crs P oK , u). RPInitVerifier(crs Sig , A): The verifier takes as input A = d a , and runs PKeygen(crs Sig ) to get (sk, pk). Then for all i ∈ Z d , it computes S i = PSign(crs Sig , sk, i). It outputs params Range = (pk, {S i } i∈Z d ). RPInitProver(crs Sig , params Range ): The prover parses params Range as (pk, {S i } i∈Z d ). It verifies the signatures by running PVerifySig(crs Sig , pk, S i , i), for all i ∈ Z d . If these verifications succeed, it outputs accept. Otherwise it outputs reject. RangeProve(crs Sig , params Range , g, σ, open σ ): The prover computes the following proof for a commit-
refer to this proof. This proof is only witness indistinguishable. While this is sufficient for our application, it is possible to make the proof zero-knowledge using techniques described in [17] .
B Proof of Theorem 4
In order to prove this theorem, we need to build a simulator E that invokes a copy of adversary A and interacts with F POT and environment Z in such a way that ensembles IDEAL F POT ,E,Z and REAL POT,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable.
In our proof we make use of the fact that Groth-Sahai proofs are extractable and composable witnessindistinguishable. As we deal with static security, the adversary needs to chose which party to corrupt before the protocol starts. We can, therefore, address the case of the malicious vendor and the malicious buyer separately.
Case (I). Security against malicious vendor:
1. E runs algorithm PoKSetup to generate a Groth-Sahai reference string crs P oK under DLIN instance for a pairing group setup (p, G, G T , e, g), where p max < A (mod p) holds. E picks random u ← G, selects distinct random z 1 , . . . , z n ← Z * p and computes
zi , i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j, where, crs P oK = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) and t 3 = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ), say. E runs PKeyGen(crs Sig ) to obtain (pk, sk) where crs Sig = (crs P oK , u). E computes s i = PSign(crs Sig , sk, z i ), i = 1, . . . , n. E sets crs = (crs P oK ,
When F CRS is queried, E returns (sid, crs). 2. At time t = 0, upon receiving (sid, params Range ) from A, E checks params Range as described in
POTInitBuyer and aborts when the check fails. Otherwise E sends (sid, V) to F POT . 3. Upon receiving (sid, ac 0 ) from F POT , E computes (P, D (P riv) 0 ) by running POTInitBuyer. E sends (sid, P ) to A and keeps D (P riv) 0 . 4. At time t > 0, on publication of (sid, Pub) by A, E notes the set of item prices {p 1 , . . . , p n } from Pub and sends (sid, V, Pub) to F POT . Upon receiving (sid, request) from
, σ min ), where σ t = σ min corresponds to the index of the message with the lowest price for that time, to obtain (Q,
) and sends (sid, Q) to A. Observe that, since we use the item with the lowest price, A never rejects on the basis of not having enough funds. Upon receiving the response (sid, R) from A, E parses R as
zi using the secret values z i known to itself, where Q = (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , pok t , D t ) and h 3 = Commit(g zσ min pσ min , open zσ min pσ min ) = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) are as defined in the POT protocol of Section 4, i.e., w 3 is the group token for the group attribute {p σmin } according to the membership encryption discussed in Section 3. E inputs (sid, {M 1 , . . . , M n }) to F POT .
Claim (Buyer's security). When V is corrupted, the ensembles IDEAL F POT ,E,Z and REAL POT,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable under the DLIN assumption.
Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that environment Z cannot distinguish between the real execution ensembles REAL POT,A,Z and the simulated ensembles IDEAL F POT ,E,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr[Game i] the probability that Z distinguishes between the ensembles of Game i and that of the real execution.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real world protocol with an honest B.
Therefore, Pr[Game 0 ] = 0. Game 1: This game differs from the previous game in that at each time t > 0, the request Q = (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , pok t , D t ) is computed by executing POTRequest(crs, params Range , {p 1 , . . . , p n }, D
, σ min ), where σ min corresponds to the message with the lowest price for that time. Since (h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , pok t , D t ) are computationally witness indistinguishable under the DLIN assumption, Q cannot be distinguished from a request computed by using another selection value σ t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. E performs the changes mentioned in Game 1 but for i = 1, . . . , n, E uses the ciphertexts sent by A to compute messages M i = C
i /e(w 3 /u pi i , C
i ) zi using the secret values z i , where (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ) = Commit(g zσ min pσ min , open zσ min pσ min ) and sends (si, {M 1 , . . . , M n }) to F POT . The crs generated by E is identically distributed as the real crs. Also upon receiving P = ac 0 from F POT , E computes and sends P by following POTInitBuyer and stores private state D (P riv) 0 exactly as in real protocol. At time t > 0, E notes {p 1 , . . . , p n } from Pub published by A and sends Pub to F POT . Further, E computes a request for σ min by using D (P riv) t−1 and stores private state information D (P riv) t . Note that the distribution produced in Game 1 is identical to our simulation of the ideal ensemble. Therefore,
Case(II). Security against malicious buyer:
1. E sets crs = (crs P oK , {u i } i , {u i,j } i =j , {v i } i , u, pk, {q i } i , {s i } i ) exactly in the same way as in Step 1 of Case (I) except that to construct crs P oK , E executes algorithm PoKExtractSetup to obtain an extraction trapdoor td ext along with crs P oK . E returns (sid, crs) when F CRS is queried. 2. Upon receiving sid from F POT , E runs POTInitVendor(crs, A) to obtain params Range . E sends (sid, params Range ) to A. 3. Upon receiving (sid, P = ac 0 ), E runs D 0 ← POTGetDeposit(crs, P, A), sends (sid, B, ac 0 ) to F POT and stores D 0 . 4. At time t > 0, after getting (sid, Pub) from F POT , E notes {p 1 , . . . , p n } from Pub and publishes (sid, Pub) to A. upon receiving (sid, Q) from A, E parses Q ) and y is the instance consisting of the commitments on w that includes (D t , D t−1 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ) together with Condition(w). For the exact form of Condition(w) see the detail construction of pok t in equation (1) of Section 4. E verifies the proof pok t by running PoKVerify and utilizing the instance y. E aborts if verification fails, otherwise, E executes PoKExtract(crs P oK , td ext , y, pok t ) to extract the witness w. Then for i = 1, . . . , n, E compares u σt and g pσ t to all u i 's and g pi 's respectively to determine A's choice σ t and to check whether A has really paid the correct price corresponding to his choice. E also compares the signatures {g αj , u αj , s αj } a−1 j=0 in the extracted witness that corresponds to the range proof with each of the signatures that were sent to A in params Range and the signature {u σt , q σt , s σt } to all the signatures {u i , q i , s i } n i=1 that were sent to A in crs (this is done in order to ensure that A did not compute a forgery) and aborts if in either case no match is found, i.e., a forgery is detected. 5. If E finds that A has actually paid the price p σt , i.e., extracted u σt , g pσ t match with some u i and the corresponding g pi , E sends (sid, B, σ t ) to F POT in order to obtain M σt . Now E computes C σt exactly as V does in POTRespond of the real protocol. For i = σ t , E randomly picks C Claim (Vendor's security). When B is corrupted, the ensembles IDEAL F POT ,E,Z and REAL POT,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable under the {max{n, d}}-HSDH, {max{n, d}}-TDH and the Square DBDH assumptions, where n is the the number of messages and A = d a is the upper bound of the buyer's account.
Proof. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z cannot distinguish between the real execution ensembles REAL POT,A,Z and the simulated ensembles IDEAL F POT ,E,Z with non-negligible probability. We again denote by Pr[Game i] the probability that Z distinguishes between the ensembles of Game i and that of the real execution.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol with an honest V.
Therefore, Pr[Game 0]=0. Game 1: This game follows Game 0, except that to set crs we run PoKExtractSetup to obtain crs P oK and an extraction trapdoor td ext for a bilinear group setup (p, G, G T , e, g), where p max < A (mod p) holds. Note that crs P oK so computed is identically distributed to the output of PoKSetup and thus, |Pr[Game 1] − Pr[Game 0]| = 0. Game 2: The difference between this game and the previous one consists in that, in each time t > 0, we extract the witness of pok t by running PoKExtract(crs P oK , td ext , y, pok t ), where y is the instance of pok t as defined in the simulation. Groth-Sahai proofs being perfectly extractable, we have |Pr[Game 2] − Pr[Game 1]| = 0. Game 3: This game is identical to Game 2, except that Game 3 aborts if at least one of the extracted signatures {g αj , u αj , s αj } a−1 j=0 that are employed in the range proof does not equal any of the signatures {(g i , u i , s i )} i∈Z d , where the signatures s i are included in params Range . This means that A computed a forgery of the P-Signature scheme. The probability that Z distinguishes between Game 2 and Game 3 is bounded by the following lemma. 1 np(λ) is non-negligible in λ which contradicts the SqDBDH assumption. Case (b) This case corresponds to the situation when it is found that the proper price for σ t is not paid. In this case the response R consists of all random C i 's. Again in this case, we may assume, without loss of generality, that σ t = 1, i.e., the message M 1 is queried but the price paid is not the correct price p 1 . We define (n + 1) distributions as above with D 0 denoting the distribution where R contains all random C i 's. Clearly in this case D 0 corresponds to the distribution in Game 5 and D n that in Game 4. As above we can argue that, if the environment Z can distinguish between D 0 and D n then Z must also be able to distinguish between D µ and D µ−1 , 0 < µ ≤ n. We use Z to construct an algorithm T which solves the SqDBDH problem as Case (a) with the following modifications.
-T chooses 1 ≤ µ ≤ n, uniformly.
-While computing the request Q for σ t = 1, T uses a different price p = p 1 .
-T computes the C i 's as follows:
i ), C E performs all the changes described in Game 5, but in the initialization phase, E runs POTGetDeposit and sends ac 0 to F POT , and in each transfer phase E stores {p 1 , . . . , p n } and publishes Pub after getting Pub from F POT ; sends the choice σ t to F POT to obtain M σt provided the price p σt is paid, in which case E uses M σt to compute C σt ; otherwise E sets C σt to be a random value in G T × G. For all other i, E sets C i 's as random elements in G T × G. The distribution produced in Game 5 is identical to our simulation of the ideal ensemble IDEAL F POT ,E,Z . Therefore, by summation we have that, |Pr[Game 5]| ≤ 1 (λ) + 2 (λ) + 3 (λ) = (λ).
C Extending the Priced Oblivious Transfer of Section 4 to Subscription Setting
The motivation of a subscription is to allow efficient one-way communication from the vendor to the buyer. Here we will briefly sketch how our proposed POT can be modified to fit in a 'subscription' setting. Note that for subscription a buyer B is charged the same price p i for the i-th message effective at time of subscription even if prices may change over time. To initialize the protocol first both the vendor V and the buyer B takes crs from F CRS and V sends (sid, params Range ) to B by executing POTInitVendor as in the POT of Section 4.
Subscribing:
The buyer B computes (P, D (P riv) 0
